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TAXATION
Joseph Curtis*
JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The only tax case decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
during the period covered by this Survey involved the troublesome federal
tax lien1 and the frequendy litigated issue of its priority. The lien arises and
48. Johnson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 574, 577 (4th Cir. 1960).
49. 6 APPLEMAN, INsURANCE LAw AND PRAcnCE § 4185 (1942); 6 CouCH, CYCLOPEDIA
OF INSURANCE LAW§ 1442 (1930).
50. See, e.g., McMillan v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 282 App. Div. 1091,
126 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1953).
51. 276 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1960).
52. Oral assignments are valid in Virginia. Hughes v. Burwell, 113 Va. 598, 75 S.E.
230 (1912).
•Professor of Law, William and Mary. Member, New York and Virginia Bars.
B.S., 1934, LL.B., 1937, LL.M., 1948, New York University.
I. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6321.
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becomes fixed upon assessment of the tax2 as to all but bona .fide purchasers,
mortgagees, pledgees and judgment creditor.s whose· priority. rights are
measured with· reference to the time the tax lien ·is ·r"ecorded3 -and not to the
time the tax is assessed.
Solely as a proposition of Virginia law the landlord's lien for rents
arises upon commencement of the tenancy;4 the .lien is specific and perfected
independently of. the right to proceed by distress warrant or attachment.5
In United States v. Lawler6 a "tenancy was commenced seven years prior
to federal income tax assessments made against the tenant, but notice of the
federal tax lien· was docketed priot··to ·the ·landlord's bringing· an action
to enforce his statut{)ry lien for' unpaid rents. The trial court, in .finding
for the landlord,· applied the common law rule of "first in time-first in
right" .on the theory-·that the· federal statutes· creating and defining the tax
lien7 did ·not assert its priority and the federal statute establishing priority
of United States claims to the assets of insolvent debtors8 wa5 inapplicable.
·Following the rea5onirtg ·of United States v. Waddill; Holland & Flinn,
Inc.,!! the Supreme c·ourt·of Appeals reversed. The Court held it to· be a
federal question as to whether a landlord's lien is perfected prior in time to
a federal :tax lien -and thus, the· Virginia ·statute, while controlling as to
matters of state law; must yield on the federal issue to federal precedent.
In Waddill, Holland:& Flinn, Inc., the United States Supreme Court had
held tha~ the ·Virginia· landlord's lien, until actually enforced by levy,
was merely" a caveat of a more perfect lien to come and thus junior in time
to a federal claim. Since landlord Lawler's distress warrant, writ of attachment, and execution sale followed the federal assessment, the tax lien was
held by the Court to be .first in time.
LEGISLATION

While tax matters occupied little of the time of the Supreme Court of
Appeals, the legislature. ·was some-\vhat more active in the .field. The
following
.
. .notations do not purport to cover all of the innumerable rewrit2. ll\-r. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 6322.
3. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 6323.
·4. See VA. CoDE ANN.§§ 55~227, -231,-233 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
5. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc.,· 323"·' U.S. 353, 356 (1945)
tdictumY, reversing 182 Va. 351, 28 S.E.2d 741 (1944). The United States Supreme
Court held that the priority of a federal lien over a landlord's··uen was a federal
question and state law was not binding on the issue of when the landlord's lien be·
· · ·
··
·
comes perfected. · ·
6. 201 Va. 686, 112 S.E.2d 921 (1960).
7. INT.'RiV: CoDE OF 1954, §§ 6321-23.
8. 31 u.s.c. § 191 (1958).
9. 323 u.s. 353 (1945).
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ings, revisions and substantive changes..mad~ by the_General.~embly in
the 1960 Regular Session. They are intended to bring. to att~tion some of
the "amendments and "additions"to the tax"lirws of most general interest.:

A. · Income Tax
1. Individuals

The maximum medical expense deduction was increased to fiftee:n
thousand dollars for each disabled spouse who has attained age sixty~five. 10
These maximums and the._speci~, r~quirements to qualify, for them c_onform
with the 1958 amendment. to section 213 of the lnte~na\; J:tevenue <;:o_de: of
1954.11

A nonresident beneficiary of an estate or trust will be taxed on his
distributive share of the estate or trust income only .to the e~en.t th;lt su<;:h
income is derived from real estate or tangible personal property located in
Virginia, or from the operation of an unincorporated business or ·trade
carried on in this -state.12 However, this provision is not applicable to income accumulation trnsts, discretionary distribution trnsts, or non-distributing estates where in each case the tax is imposed-upon the tnlst or estate and
not upon the beneficiary.1a
2.

Corporations

The most significant change in the ta.~ law made in the 1960 session is
that of the adoption of a new allocation fotrnula for determining what part
of the net income of a corporation doing business both within and without
the state shall be taxed by this state. Effective for taxable years commencing
after December 31, 1961, the determitiation shall be made by an allocation
by source for rents, royalties, capital gains, interest and dividend income,
coupled with a three-factor formula of property, payroll, and sales applicable
to all other classes of incbme.14 This will supplant the present alternatives
of the nebulous separate accounting15 and the inadequate two-factor f?rmula
of property and gross receipts.16
10. VA. ConE ANN.§ 58-81(p) (3) (Supp. 1960).
11. !NT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 213 (g).
12. VA. ConE ANN.§ ·)8.:.121 (Supp. 1960).
13. VA. ConE ANN. § 58-120 (Repl. Vol. .1959); see VA. ConE ANN. § 58-118 (Repl.
Vol. 1959).
14. See VA. ConE ANN.§§ 58-131.1 to .18 (Supp. 1960).
15. VA. ConE ANN.§ 58-132 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
16. VA. ConE ANN.§ 58-131.1 (Repl. Vol. 1959). The formulae are discussed in more
detail in Hirshberg & Nadry, A. Federal Concept of Doing Business, 46 VA. L. REv.
1241, 1247-48 (1960).
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B. Intangible Personal Property Tax
Commencing in 1963 the capital of a trade or business not otherwise
specifically taxed will be taxed at sixty-five instead of seyenty-five cents
per one hundred aollars worth, 17 and henceforth such capital subject to
tax will not include the value of life insurance policies owned by the business.18

C. Excise Taxes
Increase of the motor fuel tax by one cent per gallon19 and enactment
of the sales and use taxes on tobacco products2° are now well-known to
all-at least to all who drive cars or smoke.
D. Estate and Gift Taxes
Noteworthy in this- field is what the General Assembly declined to
enact. The proposal to eliminate the gift tax and to replace the present
inheritance tax by an estate tax, designed to conform substantially with that
of the federal tax, failed to pass.

WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
Ellsworth Wiltshire•
LEGISLATION

One important enactment of the General Assembly of 1960 relates to
the transfer of securities. The Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary
Security Transfers1 appears with only three changes. 2 The act, among
other things, severely limits the duty to inquire and the concepts of
"knowledge" and "notice" as applied to the issuing corporation and its
17. See VA. ConE ANN.§ 58-418 (Supp.1960).
18. VA. ConE ANN.§ 58-411(4) (Supp.1960).
19. VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-711 (Supp. 1960).
20. See VA. ConE ANN.§§ 58-757.1 to .27 (Supp. 1960).
• Professor of Law, University of Richmond. Member, Virgbia Bar. B.A., 1919,
LL.B., 1922, University of Virginia; S.JD., 1923, Harvard University.
I. Approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 43-51 (Supp. 1959). The act is discussed in further detail in
Gibson & Freeman, Business Associations, 1959-1960 Ann. Survey of Va. Law, 46 VA.
L. REv. 1481 (1960).
2. VA. ConE ANN. §§ 13.1-424 to -433 (Supp. 1960). The changes are: (1) the
inclusion of registrar in the definition of transfer agent; (2) the omission of tutor
from the definition of fiduciary; (3) and the omission of § 9 as inapplicable under
Virginia law.
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transfer agent, 3 renders unnecessary much of the burdensome documentation which transfer agents have required, provides a simple method
of resolving claims adverse to the transfer of a security by a :fiduciary,4
and limits liability of third persons participating in the acquisition, disposition, assignment, or transfer of a security by or to a :fiduciary. o
The administration of small estates is greatly simplified by two enactments. One eliminates the appointment of appraisers if the decedent's estate
does not exceed one thousand dollars.e The other permits a personal representative, in lieu of a settlement of his accounts, to :file with the commissioner of accounts a statement under oath that he has paid all known
charges against the estate and delivered the residue to himself, if he is
the sole distributee or the sole beneficiary under the decedent's will, or
if he is the residuary beneficiary under such will and his statement is accompanied by vouchers of satisfaction of all other bequests in the will.7
The danger resulting from a testator's failure to mention after-born
children in his will is removed to a considerable extent by an amendment
providing that a pretermitted child shall not share in the estate of a testator,
if such testator has a child or children living when the will is made and
such living child or children be not provided for by the will or by any
settlement.8 Apparently the statute operates on the theory that if a
testator cuts out all children living when his will is executed, he would
desire to eliminate likewise all after-born children.
Section 26-17,9 providing for the annual settlement of :fiduciaries' accounts, has been amended to substitute "testamentary trustee, trustee under
§ 37-141,£101 and receiver under § 55-44£111" for "trustee acting under a
trust created by any recorded instrument except those named in § 26-15.£121"
Hence, now no trustee under an inter vivos trust is required to make an
annual settlement of his accounts, even though the trust instrument is
recorded.
Section 26-40(23) 13 has been amended so that it no longer requires a
3. See VA. ConE ANN.§§ 13.1-426 to -428 (Supp. 1960).
4. See VA. ConE ANN.§ 13.1-429 (Supp. 1960).
5. See VA. ConE ANN. § 13.1-431 (a) (Supp. 1960).
6. VA. ConE ANN. § 64-126 (Supp. 1960).
7. VA. ConE ANN.§ 26-20.1 (Supp. 1960).
8. VA. ConE ANN.§ 64-70 (Supp. 1960).
9. VA. ConE ANN.§ 26-17 (Supp. 1960).
10. VA. ConE ANN. § 37-141 (Supp. 1960) (trustees for
persons and their beneficiaries).
11. VA. ConE ANN. § 55-44 (Repl. Vol. 1959) (receiver for
is a minor).
12. VA. ConE ANN. § 26-15 (1950). This section relates to
under any recorded deed of trust, mortgage, or assignment for
13. VA. ConE ANN.§ 26-40(23) (Supp.1960).

incompetent ex-service
a married woman who
accounts of sales made
benefit of creditors.
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mirior's guardian to obtain -coUrt approval to keep· its wa:rd's .funds invested
in certificates of deposit or in savings accounts for longer than six months.
For a deed by a foreign executor conveying land in· Virginia urider a
testamentary power to the effective, an amendment to section 64-14014 requires that it' be signed ru1d acknowledged by: an ancillary- administrator
duly appointed and qualified in Virginia.
jUDICIAL DECISIONS '

A. Wills
Other than the case first mentioned below, the Jew decisions involving
wills decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals present no unusual principles
or factS.
1. Revocation .

The most controversial and the most important case involving wills is
Timberlake v. State-Planters Bank.15 There the testatrix executed a will
in '_1954 ru1d another will in 1955. The 1955 will expressly revoked all
prior wills. She deposited both wills in executor hank for safekeeping. Later,
she withdrew the_ 1955 will stating _sl:le intended to make a new will with
changes. At her death, the 195 5 will could not be found and was presumed
destroyed by her. When the 1954 will was offered for probate, the decedent's 'heirs at law contended' that it was revoked by the 1955 will and
th~t she ~c_cordingly had died· intestate. ''The Supreme Court of Appeals
held that_the 1954 will was not revoked by the 1955 will and should be
admitted to probate. The majoriry opinion was written by Justice Buchanan.
Justice Spratley wrote a vigorous "dissenting opini()n concurred in by
Justice I'Anson.16
·
. The majority opinion took the position that, when a will contains a
clause revoking earlier wills, this clause :is well as the rest of the will becomes operative only upon and by reason of the testator's death and that,
if the testator destroys or cancels this will w1th intent to revoke it, the
revoking clause never becomes effective and hence does not operate to
revoke prior testamentary papers.
The Court refused to follow R1tdisill's Ex'r V;· Rodes,11 which held exactly to the contrary, on the ~rounds that (1) the Rudisill case failed to cite
.14. VA.CoDEANN. § 6~140 (Supp.1960) •
. '-i"
•
15. 201 Va. 950, 115 S.E.2d 39 (1960) •
. : 16. For a disc~ssio_n of tlJ.~ ·p?sition taken by _the ~se~g opinion see Barnett,
Revoc{ttion and Revival.p_f W.il,ls_ .in T(irginia, 1 U •. Rtca~ L .. NQTES ~47 (1960).
17. 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 147 (1877):
·~·-

>

-
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Barksdale v .. Barksdale;1 ~ and-{-2) the Rudisill case-seems to have assumed
or conceded that the secortfl-will with: a clause revoking-eatlier wjlls .operated
upon its execution to revoke an earlier will and devoted its attention solely
to whether the destruction of the second will revived the earlier revoked
will. However, the Rudisill case appears clearly to be a direct holding that
the second will up·on its execution revoked the earlier· will, for .otherwise
there would have been n_o reason for the- Court to consider whether the
earlier will was revived upon ·the revocation of the later will. The 4octrine .of the Rudisill ca5e was 'liniited but not overruled by
Poindexter v. ]ones19 deCided in 1958 and holding that an earlier holographic
will was not revoked-by a later holographic will which contained no express
clause of revocation but which was entirely inconsistent with the terms of
the earlier will, when the testator cancelled the later wills with intent to
revoke by tearing off her signature.
The law now appears settled in Virginia that a will is not operative or
effective for any purpose while. th~ testator is alive and, if a will is revoked
prior to death, it_ cannot prevent the probate of an earlier will, whether it
expressly revokes the e:Jrlier will or its dispositive provisions are entirely
inconsistent with the earlier will.2 0
2.

Oral Agreement To Will

Patton v. Paiton21 involved specific;: performance of a parol agreement to
devise realty. A father orally agreed to devise his interest in certain
realty to two of his children iri return for their paying off encumqrances on
his prop~rty and caring for his wife and himself during their lives. He
executed a will ~evising the realty to them, and the children performed
their part of the agreement. Mter his wife's death_, the father remarried,
was divorced, and later died. The Court held that, as the will was revoked
by the later marriage,22 he died intestate. However, it found that the parol
agreement was certain and definite, the cont:fibutions _and services of the
two children grew out of, referred to, and were given -and rendered in
pursuance of the agreement, the parol agreement was so far executed by
18. 39 Va. (12 Leigh) 535 (1842). The Barksdale case appears to hold merely that
o~e wimes~ when two were
required did not revoke an earlier will, although the instrument was sufficiently
executed to operate as a revoking instrument under the then existing statute.
19. 200 Va. 372, 106 S.E.2d 144 (1958).
20. See Note, Revocation of Wills by Subsequent Inmttment, 46 VA. ·L. REv. 373
(1960).
21. 201 Va. 705, 112 S.E.2d 849 (1960).
22. VA. ConE ANN.§ 64-58 (i9SO), was repealed byVa. Acts-1956, ch. 65.

an instrument intended as a will-but attested to by oilly
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them that a refusal to grant specific performance would operate as a fraud on
them, and specific performance should accordingly be decreed. 23
3. Estate Created

Since May v. ]oynes,24 the Supreme Court of Appeals has consistently held
that where a person is willed property with absolute dominion over it
but with a gift over to another of any portion left at the death of such
person, a fee simple in real estate and an absolute estate in personalty
passes to the first taker and the one who is to take what is left on the
death of the first taker receives nothing. This doctrine is followed in
Gardner v. W orrell,25 which presents no unusual facts.
4. Executor's Commissions cmd Liability for Interest

Bickers v. Shenandoah V. Nat'l Bank2 6 considers the proper commissions
of an executor and the executor's liability to pay interest on distributions
made after the one year statutory period;27 Bickers created a life insurance
trust agreement prior to his death. Mter his death, his widow prevailed
in her suit to have the insurance trust agreement declared void as testamentary in character.28 Thereupon the insurance proceeds were delivered
by the trustee to itself as the testator's executor. In exceptions to the
executor's account, the widow, who had renounced the will, claimed the
executor was not entitled to the five per cent commission taken by it
upon the one-third of the insurance proceeds distributable to her. She
also contended that the executor should be charged with interest on all
commissions taken by it before final distribution and also with interest on
her distributive share in realty proceeds and in personalty from one year
after its qualification until the distributions were ~de to her. The Supreme
Court of Appeals held that (1) the chancellor acted within his reasonable
discretion in allowing the commission on the insurance proceeds; (2) his
decision that the executor had earned the commissions when taken and had
acted in good faith was within his discretion and should not be disturbed;
and (3) his holding that the executor should not be charged with interest
because of the delay in making distributions must be presum:d correct and
~

23. These requisites were prescribed in Wright v. Pucket, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 370
(1872).
24. 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 692 (1871).
25. 201 Va. 355, 111 S.E.2d 285 (1959).
26. 201 Va. 257, 110 S.E.2d 514 (1959).
27. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 64-68 (1950).
28. Bickers v. Shenandoah V. Nat'l Bank, 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 889 (1955).

Annual Survey of Virginia Law

1960]

1531

binding as the evidence in that regard was taken ore tenus and was not before the Court for consideration.

B. Trusts
1.

Irrevocable Inter Vivos Trust-Unhappy Widow

In Freed v. Judith Realty & Farm Prods. Corp.,29 a widow contended
that an inter vivos trust created by her husband was in fraud of her marital
rights and that it was illusory because there was no separation of the legal
and equitable titles. The husband executed a trust agreement as to the
majority of the shares of a corporation with that corporation as trustee,
under which he was to be paid $1,500 annually during his lifetime from
the dividends and, if the dividends were inadequate, from the proceeds
of sale of sufficient shares of the stock to make up the difference. He reserved the sole right to vote the stock until his death. The corporation
trustee in tum agreed to purchase sufficient stock of the trust to enable the
$1,500 to be paid annually to him. At his death, the stock remaining in
the trust was to become the treasury stock of the corporation.
The Supreme Court of Appeals held this was a valid irrevocable inter vivos
trust for valuable consideration, in which the corporation was remainderman beneficiary and which was not testamentary and was not rendered
invalid because it was created by the husband to prevent his wife from
obtaining any part of the stock at his death. This case is in line with the
earlier Virginia cases3° giving to a married man the unqualified privilege
of disposing of his personalty during his lifetime free of his wife's marital
rights provided he has so dispossessed himself thereof as to put it beyond
his power to reclaim it.
2.

Tntstee's Right to Accounting From Agent

The owners of a number of farms and a merchantile store employed
Pulley to operate the properties as their agent. Later they transferred these
properties to trust~es to manage for them. Thereafter Pulley rendered
to the trustees and the beneficiaries annually a list of items of income and
disbursement for each preceding year, which items were not checked
with the records by the preparing accountant, the trustees, or the beneficiaries. Upon a later audit had by the trj.lstees, large discrepancies by
Pulley were revealed. The trustees file suit against Pulley for an accounting
and for jud~ent as to any deficiency. The Supreme Court of Appeals,
29. 201 Va. 791, 113 S.E.2d 850 (1960).
30. See, e.g., Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 594 (1850); Lightfoot's Ex'rs v.
Colgin, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 42 (1813).
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in Bain v: Pulley,a1: ·held· that the trustee~. ~were· entitled to an accounting
because the annual lists of income and disbrirsement: did ·not ·constitute
settlements of Pulley's accounts, acquiescence in the method of bookkeeping, and conducting the work did not constitute an estoppel, and the
trustees were not guilty nf laches•

. 3l. 201 Va. 398, 111_S.E.2d 281 (1959).

